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THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF EMPIRICISM IN
EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY JURISPRUDENCE
Lia Epperson*
"History, despite its wrenching pain
Cannot be unlived, but if faced
With courage, need not be lived again."'
INTRODUCTION
For the last half century, there has been growing national
support for racial equality and the benefits that flow from racial
diversity in education, employment, and a host of other areas. In
the court of public opinion, surveys point to a rising consensus
regarding the benefits of racially diverse environments. 2  In
addition, there is more empirical evidence supporting race-conscious
policies that aim to decrease racial isolation and enhance student
diversity in education than at any time in history. 3 In 2003, for
instance, the Supreme Court solidly upheld the constitutionality of
carefully tailored, race-conscious admissions policies to further the
compelling government interest of enhancing student body
diversity.4 In evaluating the constitutionality of such policies, the
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, S.J.D. Program, American
University Washington College of Law. B.A. Harvard College; J.D. Stanford
Law School. I am grateful for comments provided by Susan Carle and Josh
Civin.
1. Maya Angelou, Presidential Inauguration Ceremony: On the Pulse of
Morning (Jan. 20, 1993).
2. See PETER HART & BILL MCINTRUFF, NBC/WALL STREET JOURNAL
SURVEY STUDY #6095, at 21 (2009), available at http://s.wsj.net/public/resources
/documents/WSJ-NBCPoll090617.pdf. But see, e.g., Conflicted Views of
Affirmative Action, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (May 14, 2003),
http://www.people-press.org/2003/05/14/conflicted-views-of-affirmative-action;
Public Backs Affirmative Action, but Not Minority Preferences, PEW RES. CENTER
(June 2, 2009), http://www.pewresearch.org/2009/06/02/public-backs
-affirmative-action-but-not-minority-preferences.
3. See generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER
(1998); NAT'L AcAD. OF EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING
STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT
CASES (2007), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED531144.pdf; AmY
STUART WELLS ET AL., BOTH SIDES Now: THE STORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION'S
GRADUATES (2008); Janet W. Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup
Relations: A Review of the Literature, 17 REV. RES. EDUC. 335, 339 (1991).
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
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Court received more amicus curiae briefs than it had received in any
one case in recent history. Many of these briefs relied heavily on
empirical evidence that racially diverse educational environments
yielded significant short- and long-term academic, political, and
social benefits for students of all races. Drawing on this empirical
evidence, the Court opined that there is a "unique experience of
being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which
race . .. still matters."5 The multitude of amicus briefs filed
supporting the constitutionality of race-conscious policies in
education underscores how profoundly rooted the ideals of diversity
and racial equality have become.
Yet, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects a fraught
relationship between constitutional doctrine, student diversity, and
educational opportunity. Constitutional doctrine has been
insufficient in solving the dueling principles of color-blindness and
color-consciousness in addressing racial inequality in education.
While there appears to be national consensus that racial inequality
in education is intolerable and should be addressed, jurisprudence
reflects some anxiety with a solution that allocates educational
benefits based in part on individualized racial classifications. Four
years after upholding race-conscious policies in higher education, an
increasingly conservative Court accorded little weight to the many
briefs filed in support of voluntary racial integration plans in
elementary and secondary schools.6 This year, the Court heard the
first federal challenge to an affirmative action policy in higher
education in a decade. The Court's decision to hear this latest
challenge is another reminder that, in the domain of race and
education policy, constitutional doctrine remains a muddled and
complex terrain.
It is at this crossroads of existing judicial discomfort with some
race-conscious tools and broad national support for diversity and
racial equality that empiricism in educational equality cases rests.
Social science evidence has been used as a major tool in the
litigation arsenal on both sides of the debate. This is a well-
established practice. Indeed, the Supreme Court famously cited
extralegal sources in shaping constitutional doctrine on racial
equality in its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education.7
While the Court's reliance on such sources did not begin with
Brown's now-famous use of social science evidence to support a call
for racial integration,8 Brown marked a defining moment in which
5. Id. at 333.
6. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see infra Part I.
8. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11 (citing social science sources). See
generally KENNETH B. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD (2d ed. 1963). Prior to
the Brown ruling, the Supreme Court looked to biological studies like eugenics
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social science evidence became a viable avenue to help further
progressive causes in the courts.9 Scholars have marked this case as
a catalyst in American jurisprudence, noting that empirical evidence
could be a powerful force for reform.
This is particularly evident in cases advocating racial equality
in educational opportunity. In this arena, Brown ushered in a
decades-long practice of rigorous study of the short- and long-term
effects of student body diversity on educational outcomes in
elementary, secondary, and higher education.10  Such research
became a substantial component of school desegregation cases" as
well as recent jurisprudence endorsing affirmative action in higher
education in Grutter v. Bollinger.12
This new body of research used in race and education cases,
however, came with some costs. The Brown Court's reliance on
social science evidence received significant and well-documented
criticism from scholars and advocates.13 While, in theory, social
science may be used to help elucidate a constitutional middle ground
in cases regarding racial inequality, a majority of the current Court
has seemed reluctant to find such a middle ground, particularly
when only two of the Justices who upheld the constitutionality of
affirmative action in higher education less than a decade ago remain
on the Supreme Court. 14 The Court's divergent responses to the
introduction of empirical evidence in recent cases highlights a
fundamental question as to how to use such evidence within the
confines of constitutional doctrine and equal protection analysis. On
and Social Darwinism in nineteenth-century cases such as Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483, to justify a system of white
supremacy.
9. See generally Rachel F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A
Reflection on Race, Social Science, and the Law, 44 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 515 (2010)
(advocating Brown's use of social science evidence).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN
v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 711
(1976).
12. 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see infra Part IV.
13. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 8, at 185-206; KLUGER, supra note 11; Jack
M. Balkin, Rewriting Brown: A Guide to the Opinions, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE
AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 44, 50-53 (Jack M. Balkin ed.,
2002).
14. Supreme Court Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer are
the only two members of the Grutter majority currently on the Court. Three of
the four dissenters remain, including Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. In addition, two of the newer members of the
Court, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, have authored
opinions that suggest they are more likely to view race-conscious admissions
policies in a manner similar to the Grutter dissenters.
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a constitutional level, such empirical evidence, recognized by the
Supreme Court, may clarify a murky terrain with respect to racial
equality in education. Even more expansively, research on the
relationship between student-body diversity and educational
outcomes can matter greatly in the court of public opinion, which
may in turn affect broader education policy. In some respects, the
greatest potential impact of such empirical evidence may occur prior
to the filing of any legal action. It is at this early date that the
evidence has time to seep into the public consciousness and spur
public policy.
This Essay proceeds in five Parts. In Part I, I examine the
redemptive potential of the Brown Court's reliance on social science
evidence to dismantle racial apartheid. The case heralded a new
movement that looked to social science evidence to further
progressive causes and, in particular, equal educational opportunity.
In Part II, I examine the hidden costs of the burgeoning use of social
science evidence in race and education jurisprudence.15 Such costs
include the uncertainty of sociological methodology, the confines of
constitutional doctrine, and the contentious nature of racial
jurisprudence, which limits the ability of social science evidence to
gain ground as a method of resolving constitutional uncertainty.16
In Part III, I show the tremendous growth in the research touting
the benefits of diversity and racial integration that may have shaped
broad national support for the ideal of racial diversity and equality
today. Part IV examines the unique way in which the Supreme
Court has handled such empirical evidence in its two most recent
pronouncements on race and education policy in Grutter v. Bollinger
and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District.17 These cases each illustrate in different ways the promise
and the pitfalls of the Court's reliance on empiricism. This Part also
identifies the potential issues with which the Court is faced in the
most recent race and higher education case, Fisher v. University of
Texas.18 The yet-to-be-decided Fisher case offers a glimpse into the
challenge of how to situate social science evidence in this area of
judicial decision making. With an outpouring of amicus briefs in
support of the University of Texas's admissions policy19 and a very
15. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,
69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 & n.25 (1960).
16. See infra Part II; see also Jack Greenberg, Social Scientists Take the
Stand: A Review and Appraisal of Their Testimony in Litigation, 54 MICH. L.
REV. 953, 968-69 (1956).
17. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
18. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2013) (No.
11-345).
19. More than seventy amicus briefs were filed in support of the University
of Texas's admissions policy enhancing student body diversity, including briefs
from major corporations; former military leaders; more than one hundred
colleges and universities; and more than four hundred social scientists, religious
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small number of amici in support of the challenger, the Court will be
faced with the task of determining how to interpret the evidence.
History has shown us that this task is no simple charge. Finally,
Part V outlines some of the normative implications of the Court's
use of empiricism in affirmative action cases.
The analysis shows that the question is not whether courts will
use social science evidence in cases pertaining to equal educational
opportunity but rather how they will use it. Today, the
overwhelming public opinion seems to be in support of broad
definitions of racial equality and diversity. Yet, a persistent lack of
consensus remains as to how such a belief system can or should
influence constitutional doctrine on racial equality. The extent to
which courts choose to recognize the rise in empirical evidence may
well steer them to greater resolution between competing principles
of color-blindness and color-consciousness in addressing racial
inequality in education.
I. THE PROMISE OF BROWN IN ADVANCING LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
By the time the Brown case made its way to the nation's
highest Court, litigators had begun including more outside analysis
and social science evidence in briefs to buttress their cases that
racially segregated education was innately harmful. Brown v.
Board of Education's famous Footnote Eleven marked a turning
point in judicial consideration of social science evidence to support
constitutional decision making with respect to racial equality. The
Court cited to seven research studies to support its finding that
racially segregated schooling was inherently unequal and violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 20 The most
famous of the studies, conducted by psychologist Kenneth Clark,
examined white and African American children's responses to white
and black dolls to determine whether racial segregation negatively
impacted African American children's self-esteem. 21 While, prior to
the Brown litigation, advocates submitted social science evidence to
support racial segregation and stereotyping,22 Brown signaled the
use of social science evidence to dismantle a system of racial
organizations, diverse student organizations, and labor unions; as well as
Latino organizations and civil-rights organizations, including Asian-American
organizations and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on behalf of the UT Black
Student Alliance. See The Office of the Vice President for Legal Affairs, Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, Fisher v. Texas: Briefs in Support of Respondent, UNIV. TEX.
AUSTIN, http://www.utexas.edu/vplirla/Fisher-V-Texas.html#Briefs inSupport
of-Respondent, (last updated Nov. 16, 2012) (providing links to the full text of
each amicus brief).
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
21. See generally CLARK, supra note 8.
22. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME




hierarchy and subordination. The decision proved catalytic to the
rigorous study of the educational, social, and democratic benefits of
student diversity and racial integration.
A. The Precursor to Brown: Briggs v. Elliott
Brown itself was a consolidation of four cases challenging the
constitutionality of segregated schooling. 23 The famous doll study of
the Brown case originated from one of the consolidated cases, the
Briggs v. Elliott24 litigation in Clarendon County, South Carolina.
Briggs provides an early glimpse of regional jurists' resistance to
empirical evidence, as well as the lone dissenting voice in the lower
court decisions maintaining segregated education.
Under its constitution, the State of South Carolina mandated
segregation in its schools.25 Briggs arose from Clarendon County's
denial of black parents' request for public funds for transportation
for black children who lived up to ten miles from school. 26
Clarendon County already funded such transportation for rural
white children to attend schools.27 Until this point, black parents
had independently funded and operated a private transportation
system that ultimately proved too costly. 2 8  Social psychologist
Kenneth Clark conducted his famous doll study on children in a
number of areas in the country, including Clarendon County.29
Disregarding the Clark study, the lower court in Briggs held that
the state constitution required segregation. 30  Questioning the
23. Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D.S.C. 1952), rev'd sub nom.
Brown, 349 U.S. 294; Davis v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., Va., 103
F. Supp. 337, 338 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev'd sub nom. Brown, 349 U.S. 294; Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 797 (D. Kan. 1951), rev'd sub nom. Brown, 349
U.S. 294; Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, 863 (Del. Ch. 1952), rev'd sub nom.
Brown, 349 U.S. 294.
24. 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 350 (1952).
25. South Carolina's constitution read, in pertinent part: "Separate schools
shall be provided for children of the white and colored races, and no child of
either race shall ever be permitted to attend a school provided for children of
the other race." S.C. CONST. art. 11, § 7 (repealed 1973).
26. Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 538 (Waring, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. OPHELIA DE LAINE GONA, DAWN OF DESEGREGATION: J. A. DE LAINE AND
BRIGGS v. ELLIOTT 10-11, 19-23 (2011).
29. KLUGER, supra note 11, at 315-46, 355-57 (describing Kenneth Clark's
research in Clarendon County). See generally CLARK, supra note 8.
30. Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 535-36 (majority opinion). The court noted:
"There is testimony to the effect that mixed schools will give better
education and a better understanding of the community in which the
child is to live than segregated schools. There is testimony, on the
other hand, that mixed schools will result in racial friction and tension
and that the only practical way of conducting public education in
South Carolina is with segregated schools. The questions thus
presented are not questions of constitutional right but of legislative
policy, which must be formulated, not in vacuo or with doctrinaire
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relevance of such evidence describing the harms of segregation, the
majority opinion found that operating segregated schools did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment and that "this conclusion is
supported by overwhelming authority which we are not at liberty to
disregard on the basis of theories advanced by a few educators and
sociologists." 31
The lone dissenter on the district court, Judge J. Waties
Waring, discussed the expert testimony and evidence on the harms
of segregation, noticing the dearth of any opposing evidence offered
by the state: "In the instant case, the plaintiffs produced a large
number of witnesses. It is significant that the defendants brought
but two. These last two were not trained educators."32 Judge
Waring was the lone jurist prior to the Supreme Court ruling in
Brown who took note of the empirical evidence detailing
segregation's harm on all children, regardless of their race. 33
Waring noted that "[fjrom their testimony, it was clearly apparent,
as it should be to any thoughtful person, irrespective of having such
disregard of existing conditions, but in realistic approach to the
situations to which it is to be applied. . . . The federal courts would be
going far outside their constitutional function were they to attempt to
prescribe educational policies for the states in such matters, however
desirable such policies might be in the opinion of some sociologists or
educators."
Id.
31. Id. at 537.
32. Id. at 546 (Waring, J., dissenting).
33. Waring spoke at length regarding expert testimony:
"[P]laintiffs brought many witnesses, some of them of national
reputation in various educational fields.... [T]hey who had made
studies of education and its effect upon children. . . unequivocally
testified that . .. the mere fact of segregation, itself, had a deleterious
and warping effect upon the minds of children. These witnesses
testified as to their study and researches and their actual tests with
children of varying ages and they showed that the humiliation and
disgrace of being set aside and segregated as unfit to associate with
others of different color had an evil and ineradicable effect upon the
mental processes of our young which would remain with them and
deform their view on life until and throughout their maturity. This
applies to white as well as Negro children. These witnesses testified
from actual study and tests in various parts of the country, including
tests in the actual Clarendon School district under consideration.
They showed beyond a doubt that the evils of segregation and color
prejudice come from early training. And from their testimony as well
as from common experience and knowledge and from our own
reasoning, we must unavoidably come to the conclusion that racial
prejudice is something that is acquired and that that acquiring is in
early childhood . . . . This case presents the matter clearly for
adjudication and I am of the opinion that all of the legal guideposts,
expert testimony, common sense and reason point unerringly to the
conclusion that the system of segregation in education adopted and
practiced in the State of South Carolina must go and must go now."
Id. at 547-48.
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expert testimony, that segregation in education can never produce
equality and that it is an evil that must be eradicated." 34 After a
lengthy discussion, Waring concluded that "segregation is per se
inequality."35 Reviled and physically harassed, it is clear that
Waring and his dissenting opinion stood apart from most of his
colleagues and community at the time of the ruling. 36
In the example of Briggs, the district court in South Carolina
followed the ideology of the region. Segregation was so deeply
ingrained in the culture of the state, it seemed inconceivable to the
majority of the court to reach a different conclusion. Judge Waring
was also the lone dissenter of the more than twelve jurists hearing
the four cases that would ultimately be consolidated into the Brown
decision in the Supreme Court.37 It was not until the cases reached
the national platform that a majority of jurists weighed in on the
social science evidence and discussed segregation's deleterious
impact on children.
B. The Brown Decision and Its Empirical Legacy
The legal team responsible for the strategy in Brown and its
accompanying cases, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, was not
unanimous in the decision to utilize social science evidence to
buttress its legal arguments. Indeed, Thurgood Marshall and some
members of the legal team questioned the wisdom of resting such a
critical case on uncertain psychological data. 38 As such, the briefs in
the case did not reference the social science research. Rather, the
team followed the same amici strategy used a few years earlier
when they challenged the constitutionality of segregated law schools
in Texas in Sweatt v. Painter.39 In that case, law professors filed an
amicus brief.40 In Brown, the lawyers included Clark's findings in
34. Id.
35. Id. at 548.
36. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 122 (1994); see also DE
LAINE GONA, supra note 28, at 150. The dissenting opinion was Judge Waring's
final opinion before retiring. Id. at 151.
37. Erica Frankenberg, The Authority of Race in Legal Decisions: The
District Court Opinions of Brown v. Board of Education, 15 U. PA. J.L. & Soc.
CHANGE 67, 77 (2011).
38. See KLUGER, supra note 11, at 321, 356.
39. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
40. In Sweatt v. Painter, the plaintiffs provided testimony of Robert
Redfield, a law professor at the University of Chicago, who discussed evidence
that there were no differences between negroes and whites in intellectual
capacity or inability to learn. Brief on Behalf of American Jewish Committee
and B'Nai B'Rith (Anti-Defamation League) as Amici Curiae at 35, Sweatt, 339
U.S. 629 (No. 44), 1950 WL 78684, at *35. NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers
in the Briggs case read Redfield's testimony into the record. GREENBERG, supra
note 36, at 125.
496 [Vol. 48
20131 EMPIRICISM IN EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY
an appendix, which was signed by leading researchers. 41
Thurgood Marshall did, however, detail a bevy of expert
testimony during oral argument to illustrate the harms of
segregation. Researchers detailed the deprivation of equal status in
their communities, a loss of self-respect, a denial of the full
opportunity for democratic social development, and a feeling of being
stamped with the badge of inferiority.42 While it is unlikely that the
social science evidence alone served as a basis for the Court's
ultimate decision, Marshall and his colleagues nonetheless provided
the Court with authority on which to base the moral judgment they
felt compelled to make. The Court denounced the segregation
doctrine espoused by the Plessy Court: "To separate [children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."43 In addition, the Court explicitly referenced "modern
authority" on psychological harms of segregation as a basis for its
finding.44 In doing so, it distanced itself from the Plessy Court's
findings to the contrary on the lack of psychological harm of racial
segregation.45
One could fill a library with volumes written on the subject of
Brown's legacy. Here, I seek to highlight a specific piece of this
legacy. Brown signaled a watershed moment when scholars and
advocates saw the potential use of social science evidence to further
progressive causes in the courts. The short footnote that cited to the
now-famous work of social psychologist Kenneth Clark proved that
racial segregation wrought a terrible psychological harm. Scholars
have noted that the decision demonstrated how legal actors make
decisions based in part on their ideological beliefs; that legal
reasoning has some relationship to political and policy arguments;
that jurists may look to norms outside of the law to decide cases; and
that jurists, legal scholars, and legal advocates should make the law
responsive to societal changes. 46
Relatedly, because law is a professional field that focuses on the
art of oral persuasion, it takes the insights of social science
disciplines and turns them to further the arguments of litigators. 47
Brown stood for the principle that litigators advancing social justice
41. KLUGER, supra note 11, at 555-57.
42. GREENBERG, supra note 36, at 124.
43. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
44. Id.
45. Id. ("Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at
the time of [Plessy v. Ferguson], this finding is amply supported by modern
authority.").
46. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford V. Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An
Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 169-70 (2006).
47. Id.
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can look to social science authority as a tool in their civil-rights
arsenal.48 Thus, Brown proved catalytic to the rigorous study of the
educational, social, and democratic benefits of student diversity and
racial integration.49 More broadly, Brown helped legitimize the
practice of submitting amicus briefs to the Court that augmented
parties' legal analysis with extralegal sources. One study found that
from the mid-1940s to 2000, the number of amicus briefs filed
annually in the Supreme Court increased by 800%.50
Perhaps most importantly, this blooming field of empiricism
took on a new character as well. By establishing that racial
segregation in education was harmful, research could turn from the
normative study of whether state-mandated racial segregation and
subjugation was harmful to a descriptive study of exactly why
integration and diversity are laudable goals. Social science research
could shift to examining the implementation of the integrative ideal.
Such research shifted from abstract studies to more realistic
understandings of sociology. 1
Accordingly, on its face, Brown represents a victory for the
positive uses of empirical evidence in jurisprudence at the
intersection of race and education. But it is also an example of the
Justices' use of nonlegal authority to justify their normative
judgments. While the pre-Brown Court relied on nonlegal sources
such as eugenics and Social Darwinism to further entrench white
supremacy in the prior century,5 2 evidence in the wake of Brown
overwhelming supported efforts to dismantle racial segregation and
hierarchy, particularly in the domain of education.
48. See Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L. REV. 564, 568-69 (1965).
49. See generally NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., RACE CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR
ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME
COURT CASES (Robert L. Linn & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2007), available at
http://www.naeducation.org/xpedio/groups/naedsite/documents/webpage/NAED
_080863.pdf (summarizing the social science evidence in the sixty-four amicus
briefs submitted in Parents Involved); Michael Heise, Equal Educational
Opportunity by the Numbers: The Warren Court's Empirical Legacy, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1309 (2002) (looking at the use of empirical studies in the
development of the Warren Court's legacy on equal education opportunities);
Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Twenty-First Century Social Science on School Racial
Diversity and Educational Outcomes, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1173 (2008) (looking at
the significance of research studies and amicus briefs after Brown).
50. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749 (2000).
51. Frank H. Wu, Beyond the Symbolic Black and White: The New
Challenges of a Diverse Democracy, 53 How. L.J. 807, 820 (2010).
52. See, e.g., ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW 28-37 (2006).
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II. THE PITFALLS OF BROWN'S USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
In the wake of Brown, courts continued to seek constitutional
clarity on the relationship between racial integration and
educational opportunity. This journey included both legal analysis
and continued exploration of empirical evidence and social science
principles.53 Some scholars have argued that the racial equality
cases that followed Brown reinterpreted the decision away from
social science evidence and toward legal principles. 54 Decisions like
McLaughlin v. Florida,55 which struck down the State of Florida's
ban on interracial cohabitation, for example, focused on
antisubordination principles and the dismantling of white
supremacy.56 Relatedly, in Loving v. Virginia,5 7 the Supreme Court
cited to the harms of racial classifications designed to perpetuate
such supremacy.58  School desegregation cases like Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education59 included social science,
but such research played a decidedly less overt role in the Court's
ruling. The Swann Court assumed a connection between past school
segregation and present residential segregation but did not look to
social science evidence to prove that point.60 Similarly, the Supreme
Court's decision a few years later in Milliken v. Bradley61 presumed
that a history of segregation disadvantaged minority students
academically, and thus allowed for compensatory relief.62
Unfortunately, jurisprudential reliance on social science
evidence did not develop as robustly as some Brown advocates may
have anticipated. 63 While there have been numerous criticisms of
the basis for the Court's unanimous opinion,64 the early criticisms of
Brown inform the current difficulty that the Court has in
determining whether and how to weigh voluminous social science
evidence on the benefits of student body diversity. Criticisms
include the uncertainty of sociological methodology, the limitations
of constitutional doctrine, and the existence of a small amount of
53. MVichael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and
Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 307-08, 313 (2005) (noting the rise
in social science evidence in school desegregation cases).
54. See generally James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science
Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659 (2003).
55. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
56. Id. at 192-94.
57. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
58. Id. at 9-11.
59. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
60. Id. at 29-30.
61. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
62. Id. at 281-90.
63. Greenberg, supra note 16, at 965 & n.54.
64. See generally KLUGER, supra note 11; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); Balkin,
supra note 13.
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competing data, as well as the contentious nature of racial
jurisprudence and Justices' disparate views on race-conscious
policies that limit the ability of social science evidence to gain
ground as a method of resolving constitutional uncertainty.
First, the Brown decision came under fire for relying on social
science evidence that, for some, seemed too weak a hook on which to
hang the constitutional rights of African Americans. 65 Some have
argued that the decision should have adhered more closely to legal
principles rather than social science evidence.66  While such
empirical evidence may be useful in crafting policy, one could argue
that evaluating such evidence is outside the realm of expertise of the
judiciary. To rely too heavily on such evidence in lieu of established
constitutional principles weakens the Court's legitimacy. Indeed,
questions on the proper role of courts in a democratic society still
plague the legal landscape today, particularly in the current
affirmative action debate.
Moreover, the legal standard required to uphold a racial
classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment arguably diminishes the potential gravitas that social
science evidence may bring. Under the constitutional standard, any
use of race by a state actor must be narrowly tailored to satisfy a
compelling government interest.67  Empirical evidence can
demonstrate the significant benefits of race-conscious educational
policies. Such evidence demonstrates the academic benefits of
integrated classrooms and the ways in which racial integration can
have long-term democratic benefits for society as a whole. Yet,
jurists must determine whether such evidence is sufficiently
powerful that it satisfies the legal standard required. The
normative judgment to weigh the relative burdens and benefits rests
solely with the Supreme Court. Thus, while evidence by social
scientists may be important, it may not necessarily be legally
compelling.
Further, while many legal advocates and scholars assumed that
the development of neutral social science evidence would always be
for the moral good,68 not all evidence presented in such cases favors
racial integration policies. While the weight of evidence falls on the
side of favoring integration, cases challenging affirmative action in
65. Joseph P. Viteritti, A Truly Living Constitution: Why Educational
Opportunity Trumps Strict Separation on the Voucher Question, 57 ANN. SURv.
AM. L. 89, 94 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 32 (1959).
66. See generally Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About
Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537 (2004).
67. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
68. Moran, supra note 9, at 522 (noting that the Law and Society
movement was doomed at its inception due to the paradox that assumed a
"value free approach to building an intellectual movement").
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higher education and voluntary integration in elementary and
secondary schools often feature dueling experts. Those in favor of
integration demonstrate through empirical evidence the benefits of
such plans, while the challengers hire experts who attempt to show
the relatively minor benefits of using such plans. The choice to rely
on dubious social science to thwart desegregation and affirmative
action efforts hearkens back to a history we would like to forget.
This choice bears resemblance to the use of extralegal sources used
by jurists more than a century ago to provide authority for
maintaining racial segregation and white supremacy. In the wake
of Brown, such dueling experts may limit the emphasis jurists place
on social science evidence. Depending on the normative judgments
of Justices, they may rely on whatever authority is available. 69
Finally, constitutional debates on racial equality have proven to
be a truly contentious battleground. In such an arena, debates in
moral absolutes have made the use of practical social science
evidence in finding a middle ground more difficult than advocates of
the Brown strategy could have anticipated. 70 Formalists advocate
for color-blindness as the guiding principle, whereas civil rights
advocates argue in favor of color-conscious remedies for pervasive
and pernicious effects of racism. Other divisive areas of
constitutional doctrine, such as abortion jurisprudence, have utilized
nonlegal sources to create doctrine somewhere between two
opposing camps.71 Yet, constitutional doctrine has thus far been
insufficient to address the dueling principles of color-blindness and
color-consciousness. 72 The Roberts Court in particular has shown
reluctance to find a constitutional middle ground in cases regarding
racial equality. While, theoretically, social science may be used to
craft such a middle ground, it has often been used in a polarizing
fashion.73
69. See infra Part V (comparing reliance on social science evidence by the
Grutter Court upholding affirmative action and the Parents Involved Court
striking down voluntary integration).
70. Greenberg, supra note 16, at 967-68.
71. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-92
(1992),
72. Lia Epperson, New Legal Perspectives: Implications for Diversity in the
Post-Grutter Era, in DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: TOWARD A
MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 260, 270-71 (Lisa M. Stulberg & Sharon
Lawner Weinberg eds., 2011).
73. Moreover, constitutional doctrine has ineffectively grappled with the
true factual complexities inherent in cases at the intersection of race and
educational opportunity. Take the example of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued
that the challenged affirmative-action-in-public-contracting policy should be
upheld on intermediate scrutiny grounds. Id. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
While this may be a superior method of constitutional measurement, the
Richmond policy possessed a fatal flaw with which proponents of affirmative
action failed to engage. The policy provided a preference for a host of
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Due to these challenges, jurists have not engaged the
abundance of social science evidence supporting student diversity
and racial integration to the extent that Brown presaged. In
addition, due in part to the contentious nature of these debates and
the Supreme Court's changing ideological composition, the Court
may be less willing to engage with this evidence. Much like Fox
News's depiction of "fair and balanced" news coverage, here there is
a "Foxification" of the presentation of social science evidence; while
there is overwhelming evidence in favor of policies designed to
decrease racial isolation and improve educational outcomes, it
receives proportionally less attention than the few voices in
opposition to policies fostering racial inclusion and student
diversity.74 If the reality of Brown is that Justices can look to
outside sources to support their own normative judgments, then the
changing ideology of the Court suggests that a majority of Justices
may be more likely to ignore empirical evidence supporting policies
that foster racial integration in favor of any authority that supports
the theory that individualized racial classifications are always
wrong.
III. EVIDENCE IN THE CURRENT DEBATE ON RACIAL DIVERSITY IN
EDUCATION
In the more than half century since the Supreme Court's
reference to evidence on the harms of racial segregation in Brown,
social science evidence detailing the relationship between racial
integration and education has grown exponentially. Much of this
research has focused on the substantial short- and long-term
benefits of racially integrated elementary and secondary schools.
Yet, the data also focus on the robust relationship between student-
body diversity in higher education and its academic, social, and
democratic benefits.
In the realm of K-12 education, research detailed the academic
effects of desegregation policies on increasing educational outcomes
for racial minorities, such as improving test scores in math and
science,75 raising graduation rates,76 and increasing college
underrepresented minority groups, including Aleuts, even though there was no
history of discrimination in the Richmond, Virginia contracting industry
against Aleuts. Id. at 550 n.11.
74. See infra Part V.
75. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATUS
AND TRENDS IN THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS 50-53 (2003) (finding that
desegregation, the war on poverty programs, and affirmative-action policies
that increased African American educational opportunities led to closing of the
racial achievement gap).
76. Gary Orfield, Unexpected Costs and Uncertain Gains of Dismantling
Desegregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BRowN
v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 73, 85 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996)
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attendance.77 In addition, studies found significant "democracy
benefits" to desegregated schools. These include access to higher
status networks and institutions that may provide long-term
opportunities. 78
Social science evidence has found that the so-called "democracy"
benefits of racially diverse educational environments apply to
students of all races.79  Students benefit from racially diverse
environments, as they help dissolve racial stereotypes and facilitate
a greater understanding of people of different races.80 Students in
racially diverse educational institutions are more likely to be more
civically engaged and to socialize across racial and ethnic lines.8 In
addition, students are more likely to be more politically engaged. 82
Much of this research looks specifically to the effect of racially
diverse higher education. 83 Peer-reviewed social science evidence
confirms that graduation rates for underrepresented minorities
improve when affirmative action policies give them greater access to
selective colleges and universities.84
(detailing increased graduation rates for African Americans in the wake of
desegregation policies).
77. See David Grissmer et al., Why Did the Black-White Score Gap Narrow
in the 1970s and 1980s?, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 182, 199-200,
221 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); James McPartland &
Jomills Braddock, Going to College and Getting a Good Job: The Impact of
Desegregation, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: EQUITY, QUALITY, AND
FEASIBILITY 141, 141 (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981) (detailing the relationship
between desegregation and increased college matriculation and graduation
rates for African Americans).
78. Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the
Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REV. EDUC. RES. 531, 531-35
(1994); see also AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., BOTH SIDES Now: THE STORY OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION'S GRADUATES (2009) (detailing a study of the
democracy-reinforcing benefits of racially integrated education).
79. See, e.g., Patricia Gurin et al., The Benefits of Diversity in Education for
Democratic Citizenship, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 17, 20-26 (2004) (conducting a study
at the University of Michigan of a curricular program of students from racially
diverse backgrounds and finding that the "presence of diverse others"
contributed significantly to the students' motivation to take the perspective of
others and commitment to civic participation during and after college).
80. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, 330 (2003).
81. Mitchell J. Chang, The Positive Educational Effects of Racial Diversity
on Campus, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 175, 183 (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001).
82. See generally BOWEN & BOK, supra note 3; NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra
note 3; Schofield, supra note 3.
83. See generally Nicholas A. Bowman, Promoting Participation in a
Diverse Democracy: A Meta-Analysis of College Diversity Experiences and Civic
Engagement, 81 REV. EDUC. RES. 29 (2011); Nida Denson & Mitchell J. Chang,
Racial Diversity Matters: The Impact of Diversity-Related Student Engagement
and Institutional Context, 46 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 322 (2009).
84. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., CROSSING THE FINISH LINE:
COMPLETING COLLEGE AT AMERICA'S PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 106-08, 208-16 (2009)
(finding a positive graduation rate effect at more selective institutions,
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IV. RECENT USES OF EMPIRICISM IN RACE AND EDUCATION
JURISPRUDENCE
In the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on race
and education, the Court has engaged inconsistently with the
abundance of empirical evidence regarding student diversity and
educational outcomes. There is an interesting phenomenon taking
place in the recent uses of empiricism in race and education
jurisprudence. The overwhelming body of social science evidence
introduced in such cases is brought to show the compelling state
interest in enhancing student body diversity and decreasing racial
isolation and the positive effects such policies have on educational,
democratic, and social outcomes. It largely supports focused efforts
to maximize racial inclusion in elementary, secondary, and higher
education. Due to the aforementioned pitfalls, however, jurists have
not always fully embraced such evidence. At the same time, less
robust empirical evidence opposing race-conscious policies seems to
be gaining greater attention. As the Court continues its ideological
march to the right, such research may gain a greater foothold both
in the court of public opinion and with some jurists. The Court's
2003 Grutter v. Bollinger decision, relying on empirical evidence to
endorse carefully tailored affirmative action policies in higher
education, provides a thought-provoking contrast to the Court's
refusal to weigh similar evidence in its decision striking down
voluntary integration plans five years later.
A. Grutter v. Bollinger
In Grutter v. Bollinger and its companion case, Gratz v.
Bollinger,85 the Court held that race-conscious university
admissions policies to promote student body diversity may be
constitutionally permissible if used modestly and flexibly.86 In each
case, white students challenged the university's use of race-
conscious admissions policies. They argued the policies violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bars discrimination by any
federally funded entity.87 The Grutter Court received more than
particularly for African Americans and Latino students); Kalena E. Cortes, Do
Bans on Affirmative Action Hurt Minority Students? Evidence from the Texas
Top 10% Plan, 29 ECON. EDUC. REV. 1110, 1119 (2010). See generally sources
cited supra note 82.
85. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
86. Id. at 271-73; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003). In the
Michigan cases, the Supreme Court reinforced its view that those federal
statutes applicable to private universities embrace the same standards as the
constitutional principles that apply to public universities. Gratz, 539 U.S. at
287. As such, the Court's ruling in the cases applies to both public and private
universities.
87. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
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eighty amicus briefs, representing the largest number of amicus
briefs filed for a single case in United States Supreme Court history.
This reflects a practice that began in Sweatt v. Painter and Briggs v.
Elliott of using amici to support efforts to dismantle racial
segregation. More than three-quarters of the amicus briefs filed in
Grutter supported the university's use of affirmative action.88 The
large number of amicus briefs that substantially cite to social
science evidence shows how deeply entrenched the ideals of diversity
and racial equality have become in education. Briefs discussed the
importance of racial diversity for the needs of an increasingly
diverse global marketplace and for our national security. 89 Such
benefits include better "cross-racial understanding," disintegration
of "racial stereotypes," and facilitating a "better understand[ing of]
persons of different races."90 Indeed, the Court held that such
benefits are integral to sustaining our democracy and cultivating the
next generation of leaders who are capable of navigating a racially
and ethnically diverse landscape.91 Based on this evidence, the
Court concluded that "[tlhe Law School's assessment that diversity
will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by
respondents and their amici."92 In addition, the Court deferred
substantially to the University of Michigan Law School's expertise
in culling together a diverse student body. 93
A majority of the Justices were moved by the evidence
presented detailing the relationship between student diversity and
educational and democratic outcomes, or ways in which diversity
helps prepare students to be better citizens in a democracy. 94 Yet,
the Grutter plaintiffs also provided social science evidence to rebut
claims that increased student body diversity enhances academic,
intellectual, and democratic engagement. 95 Only Justice Thomas
raised the competing empirical evidence suggesting that affirmative
88. Brendan Koerner, Do Judges Read Amicus Curiae Briefs?, SLATE (Apr.
1, 2003), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and.politics/explainer/2003/04/do
judges read amicus curiae briefs.html.
89. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308; see Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading
American Businesses in Support of Respondents at 1, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399056, at *1; Consol. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius
W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 1787554, at *10.
90. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, 330.
91. Id. at 324.
92. Id. at 330-33 (detailing findings of amici).
93. Id. at 328-29.
94. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin at 4, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003), No. 97-75321 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 1998).
95. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Nat'l Ass'n of Scholars in Support of
Petitioners at 7, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 145515, at *7;
ROBERT LERNER & ALTHEA K. NAGAI, A CRITIQUE OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF
PATRIcIA GURIN IN GRATz v. BOLLINGER 1 (2001), available at http://50.116.98.17
/-ceousalattachments/article/534/Gurin%2OCritique.pdf.
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action policies may actually harm African American students.96
While one may think this suggests longevity for the Court's decision
in Grutter, only two of the original five Justices in the Grutter
majority remain on the bench today. Among the dissenting Justices
in Grutter, the ideal of color-blindness continues to gain ground.
B. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1
In 2007, the Supreme Court struck down two racial integration
plans 97 voluntarily98 adopted by school districts in Seattle,
Washington and in Jefferson County, Kentucky,99 a decision that
academic commentators and legal practitioners widely believe has
limited constitutional remedies for racial segregation in schools.
The Court determined that the policies at issue did not satisfy the
strict scrutiny requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.100 Social science research figured prominently in
the amicus briefs submitted by both the petitioners and the
respondents in the case. 101 Of the sixty-four amicus briefs filed in
the case, nearly half significantly focused on social science
research. 102 Of those briefs, there were nearly five times as many
filed in support of the respondents, who defended the
constitutionality of the diversity policies, as were filed in opposition
to the policies. 103 Research focused on the relationship between
racial composition and educational outcomes. Specifically, research
examined whether racially diverse student bodies constituted a
96. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Clarence
Thomas was the only Justice in Grutter to question the emphasis that elite law
schools place on LSAT scores. Evidence submitted by one amicus brief detailed
the deleterious effects of the test. See id. at 367-71; Brief of the Soc'y of Am.
Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399060, at *16. Thomas questioned the
reliance on a racially discriminatory test and its imperfect suggestion that law
school admissions are merit based. This may be an area for future research to
affect the Court's opinion. Indeed, in the decade since this decision, affirmative
action critic Richard Sander has focused on test scores to challenge the benefits
of affirmative action policies. See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 410-18
(2004).
97. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 734-35 (2007) (plurality opinion); id. at 783-84 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
98. I use the term "voluntarily" to distinguish integration plans that school
boards adopted by choice from those plans that school boards adopted pursuant
to a court order to eliminate the vestiges of state-mandated segregation.
99. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 707.
100. Id.
101. NAT'L AcAD. OF EDUC., supra note 49, at 6 (summarizing the social
science evidence in the sixty-four amicus briefs submitted in Parents Involved).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 47-48.
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compelling state interest and, if so, whether the policies at issue
were sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy that interest. The
briefs filed in support of respondents included those filed by the
American Educational Research Association ("AERA"),104 the
American Psychological Association ("APA"),05 and 553 preeminent
social scientists. 106
Interestingly, in his opinion striking down the voluntary
integration policies at issue, Chief Justice Roberts made clear his
belief that race-conscious policies should never be used. 07 In an
opinion furthering this ideology, Roberts hearkened back to the
lower court's dismissal of social science evidence in Briggs and chose
not to engage with the overwhelming social science evidence offered
by amici.10 Roberts turned the Brown logic on its head, suggesting
that the Court had an obligation to strike down any race-conscious
policy: "[I]t was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of
legally separating children based on race on which the Court relied
to find a constitutional violation." 09 While this statement is true,
arguably the most famous excerpt of Chief Justice Warren's opinion
in Brown details the psychological damage wrought by a system of
governmentally sponsored racial hierarchy and segregation, the very
ills the policies in Parents Involved were designed to address.110
Yet, in Parents Involved, the Roberts plurality looked to Brown to
support its finding that school districts lacked constitutional power
to craft the voluntary racial integration policies at issue. Roberts
noted that, "[w]hen it comes to using race to assign children to
schools, history will be heard.""'1 In addition, Roberts found that
"full compliance [with Brown requires school districts] to achieve a
system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis."112 While the majority of evidence from the time of
104. See generally Brief of the Am. Educ. Research Ass'n as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos. 05-908, 05-
915), 2006 WL 2925967.
105. See generally Brief for Amici Curiae the Am. Psychological Ass'n and
the Wash. State Psychological Ass'n in Support of Respondents, Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2927084.
106. See generally Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL
2927079.
107. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720-21.
108. Id. at 761-68.
109. Id. at 705.
110. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [African
American children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.").
111. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746.
112. Id. at 746-47 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01
(1955)).
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Brown until the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Parents Involved
detailed the benefits of racial integration on academic achievement
and democratic citizenship,113 Roberts chose to hearken back to
Brown to introduce the notion that any focus on race in furthering
student diversity actually causes harm. Though a vocal judicial
minority actively engaged with the overwhelming social science
evidence,114 the dominant majority in Parents Involved disfavored
the evidence.
While Roberts largely chose to ignore the social science evidence
offered by amici in support of the school districts' integration
policies, Justice Breyer's dissent spent substantial time discussing
the evidence.115 Breyer cited social science evidence to support a
finding that furthering student diversity and decreasing racial
isolation constitute compelling state interests.116 Thus, the majority
of the Court's differing treatment of social science evidence in
Grutter and Parents Involved highlights the impact that reliance on
such evidence may have on a case's outcome. This has significant
implications for the Court's next examination of race and
educational policy.
C. Fisher v. University of Texas: The New Frontier
Similar to Grutter and Parents Involved, Fisher v. University of
Texas offers a glimpse into the challenge of how to situate social
science evidence in judicial decision making. With an outpouring of
amicus briefs in support of the University of Texas's admissions
policy"17 and a comparatively miniscule number of amici in support
of the challenger, the Court will be faced with the task of how to
interpret the evidence. History has shown us that this is no simple
order.
The case represents a similar trend to Grutter and Parents
Involved in the submission of amicus briefs with substantial social
science evidence. In Fisher, seventy-three amicus briefs were filed
in support of the University of Texas's affirmative-action policy,
while only eighteen amicus briefs were filed in support of the
petitioner. 18  Supporters of the Texas policy included major
corporations; former military leaders; more than one hundred
colleges and universities; and more than four hundred social
scientists, religious organizations, diverse student organizations,
labor unions, and civil-rights organizations."19
113. See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., supra note 49, at 3.
114. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 838-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 838-40, 869-76 (reprinting substantial empirical support).
116. See id. at 838-41, 846.
117. See supra note 19.
118. See supra note 19.
119. See supra note 19.
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Critics of affirmative action who support the Fisher plaintiffs
challenge raise an argument similar to Chief Justice Roberts's
argument in the Parents Involved case. They subvert the Brown
Court's finding on the psychological harm of racial segregation by
suggesting there is a stigmatic harm resulting from affirmative
action. 120 In addition, they have proffered two related, fallacious
arguments. Critics argue that race-conscious admissions policies
are the overwhelming cause of all racial and ethnic differences in
standardized test scores and that such policies cause an "academic
mismatch."121 Of the briefs filed in support of the petitioners that
rely on social science evidence, most cite to a single study conducted
by UCLA law professor Richard Sander.122 Sander's study raises
the claim of "academic mismatch."123 He argues that affirmative-
action policies actually harm the intended beneficiaries by granting
them access to elite academic environments for which they are
unprepared and therefore in which they do not succeed.124 While
120. Brief for Petitioner at 41-42, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-
345 (5th Cir. May 21, 2012), 2012 WL 1882759, at *41-42; Brief for the Cato
Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 15, Fisher, No. 11-345
(5th Cir. May 29, 2012), 2012 WL 1961247, at *15; Brief for the Ctr. for
Individual Rights in Support of the Petitioner at 13-14, Fisher, No. 11-345 (5th
Cir. May 24, 2012), 2012 WL 1950265, at *13-14; Amicus Curiae Brief of
Mountain States Legal Found, in Support of Petitioner at 6-7, Fisher, No. 11-
345 (5th Cir. May 25, 2012), 2012 WL 1950268, at *6-7.
121. Brief for the Asian Am. Legal Found. and the Judicial Educ. Project as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Fisher, No. 11-345 (5th Cir. May 29,
2012) 2012 WL 1961250, at *2; Amicus Brief of Gail Heriot et al. in Support of
the Petitioner at 6-7, Fisher, No. 11-345 (5th Cir. May 29, 2012), 2012 WL
1950270, at *6-7 (stating that affirmative action policies in higher education
"have created a credentials gap up and down the academic pecking order");
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Louis D. Brandeis Ctr. for Human Rights Under
Law et al. in Support of Petitioner at 5-7, 19-20, Fisher, No. 11-345 (5th Cir.
May 29, 2012), 2012 WL 1961252, at *5-7, *19-20; Brief Amici Curiae for
Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of Neither Party at 3-4,
Fisher, No. 11-345 (5th Cir. May 29, 2012), 2012 WL 1950266, at *3-4.
122. Rachel Godsil, Affirmative Action and the Unprepared Minority Myth,
L.A. TIMEs (Oct. 9, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/09/news/la-ol
-affirmative-action-godsil-blowack-20121010 ("Scholars who have examined the
research-virtually all of it by Sander himself-have found it deeply flawed. It
contradicts the mountain of evidence that minority students who attend
selective law schools and colleges tend to be more likely to graduate and to have
higher earnings than those who attend less selective schools.").
123. See generally Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor,
Jr. in Support of Neither Party, supra note 121; RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART
TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: How AFFIRMATIVE AcTION HURTS STUDENTS IT'S
INTENDED TO HELP AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON'T ADMIT IT (2012); Richard H.
Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,
57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004).
124. Sander, supra note 123, at 425-30. Sander found that in elite law
schools, 51.6% of African American law students had first year GPAs in the
bottom 10% of their class, while only 5.6% of white students fell into this
category. Id. at 427. Sander contends that such results are due almost
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the majority of the social science evidence proffered by amici in
opposition to Texas's affirmative-action plan hearkens back to this
singular study, the evidence has received significant attention in the
media.125
For example, three commissioners on the United States Civil
Rights Commission submitted a brief in support of the petitioners
that links to Sander's mismatch theory. 126 The commissioners
advocated against the use of race-conscious policies, which they
believed would harm racial minorities. The lower grades caused by
Sander's "academic mismatch" theory decrease the self-confidence of
minority students.127
The notable consideration granted to a singular empirical voice
opposing the use of race-conscious admissions policies highlights the
particularly fractious nature of the social science debate and
illustrates the true challenges in finding a compromise in the
debates over constitutional middle ground in such cases. Contrary
to Sander's theory, voluminous data culled over decades
demonstrate the positive effect of such policies. 128 Peer-reviewed
social science research confirms that graduation rates for
underrepresented minorities improve when affirmative-action
policies give them greater access to selective colleges and
universities.12 9 Moreover, it is worth noting that the Court in
Grutter never stated that educational benefits flowing from diversity
must include a benefit to minority applicants alone to satisfy the
strict-scrutiny requirement.
V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
How the Court ultimately uses the social science evidence
presented in Fisher and in the future may depend on factors beyond
a simple weighing of experts. In principle, one of the best uses of
exclusively to affirmative-action policies. Id. at 440. Sander argues that were
those students at less elite institutions, they would fare better. Id.
125. See, e.g., Godsil, supra note 122; George Leef, Richard Sander and
Stuart Taylor on Fisher, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.nationalreview.com/phi-beta-cons/330745/richard-sander-and-stuart
-taylor-fisher-george-leef; Richard Sander & Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Painful
Truth About Affirmative Action, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/nationallarchive/2012/10/the-painful-truth-about-
affirmative-action/263122/; Robert Siegel, How Does Affirmative Action Impact
Colleges?, NPR (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/09/162591214/how
-does-affirmative-action-impact-colleges.
126. Amicus Brief of Gail Heriot et al. in Support of the Petitioner at 4-8,
Fisher, No. 11-345 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2011), 2011 WL 5007903, at *4-8.
127. Id. at 8-9, 2011 WL 5007903, at *8-9.
128. William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons
for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 99-102 (2013) (citing the voluminous body
of peer-reviewed social science data rebutting claims made by affirmative-action
critics, including Richard Sander).
129. Id.; see, e.g., sources cited supra note 82.
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empirical evidence in this arena is to help clarify constitutional
theory by illuminating whether and how diversity and decreasing
racial isolation are compelling state interests under the equal
protection standard. Regardless of one's views with respect to the
constitutionality of race-conscious programs in education, a lack of
constitutional clarity in the field hampers the ability of institutions
to move forward in crafting policy. As I have argued elsewhere,
Supreme Court jurisprudence and subsequent federal and state
political action reflect some indecision in matters of race, equality,
and education. 130 Existing empirical evidence provides a valuable
tool for elucidating doctrine and paving the way for clear action.
Yet, the potential impact of empirical evidence may depend
largely on factors outside traditional constitutional decision making.
These include the Justices' own normative views on race-conscious
education policies, which may be influenced by the tenor of national
opinion on such policies. Beyond the courts, empirical evidence may
have an even broader impact in shaping public opinion and federal
political action.
A. Judicial Ideology and the Impact of Public Opinion
While Brown is famous for its reliance on social science
evidence, it is also widely believed that the Court utilized empirical
evidence simply as a justification for the normative moral judgment
of the jurists that segregation was a terrible evil.131 In the realm of
school-desegregation jurisprudence, social science evidence has
played a significant, though not primary, role. 132 Constitutional
scholars such as Professors Jack Balkin and Mark Tushnet have
long argued that the Supreme Court is part of the "national political
coalition"133 and that Justices tend to vote with the national
majority.134 However, national public opinion and the opinion of
national elites do not always cleave. When this is the case, there is
130. See Epperson, supra note 72, at 261.
131. James E. Ryan, Race Discrimination in Education: A Legal Perspective,
105 TEACHERS C. REC. 1087, 1094 (2003).
132. Id.
133. Balkin, supra note 66, at 1538.
134. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 144
(1999). Indeed, even after the Supreme Court ruled in Brown in 1954, thereby
reversing the lower court ruling in Briggs, the District Court for the Eastern
District of South Carolina issued a per curiam opinion acknowledging that
Brown overturned the lower court decision but did not actually mandate
integration:
"Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court
takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend.
The Constitution . . . does not require integration; it merely forbids
discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the
result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental
power to enforce segregation."
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
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a question as to how Justices rule. Balkin argues that the Court
rules according to the ideology of its own base, which is composed of
national elites.135
National support for the broad ideals of racial equality and
diversity is more robust today than at any point in history. There is
broad consensus that racial inequality in education is unacceptable
and should be addressed. Yet, our constitutional doctrine reflects a
discomfort with using color-conscious tools that may be most
effective in realizing the ideal of racial equality. Much like
constitutional doctrine, national opinion regarding the use of race-
conscious policies to further educational equality is anything but
clear. While the existing constitutional framework gives
universities significant latitude in creating policies to further
diversity, a lack of detailed information on successful policies tied
with strong advocacy in opposition to race-conscious policy making
has decreased the potential breadth and impact of diversity
measures. 136 Moreover, it means that public opinion regarding such
measures remains complicated.
In an area like affirmative action, there are many ways such
empirical evidence may be used. While the overwhelming evidence
supports the carefully tailored use of race-conscious policies to
increase educational opportunity, the current composition of the
Court suggests that at least a plurality has displayed an aversion to
policies that require individualized considerations of race. Though
expansive, peer-reviewed social science literature now touts the
benefits of diversity, there is a pervasive belief that some judicial
antipathy to extensive civil rights enforcement may ultimately
outweigh sophisticated distinctions on the constitutional use of race-
conscious policies in education.
B. Beyond the Courts: Shaping Opinion and Policy
In addition, regardless of how explicitly jurists rely on social
science evidence in making determinations with respect to
constitutional doctrine in race and education cases, such research on
the relationship between student-body diversity and educational
outcomes can matter greatly in the court of public opinion. Here,
such evidence may have its largest impact. Studies have indicated
that public support of affirmative action policies increases with a
corresponding increase in the information available. 13 7 Due to the
limited effect of amicus briefs in swaying the hearts and minds of
judges, lawyers advocating for social justice have also looked to
affecting public consciousness prior to these decisions.
135. Balkin, supra note 66, at 1539.
136. Id. at 1539-40.
137. Geoffrey T. Wodtke, The Impact of Education on Intergroup Attitudes: A
Multiracial Analysis, 75 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 80, 82 (2012).
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Ultimately, this trend may help shape judicial decision making
as well, as judges are influenced by real world events.138 To this
end, the timing of the research and the dissemination of the
evidence are critical. Such evidence has the potential to have a
greater impact the earlier courts understand how such policies affect
educational equity.139 Thus, the greatest potential impact of such
social science evidence may be before an action is ever filed.140 It is
more likely to change hearts and minds if it has time to permeate
the public consciousness.
Finally, the use of social science research may have an even
broader impact via other branches of government, particularly the
federal political branches. Whereas, in Brown, qualitative research
conducted on a small scale proved catalytic to the courts, in more
recent years, federal legislation has emphasized large-scale
quantitative research in education policy. The accountability and
assessment measures using scientific research in the No Child Left
Behind Act provide a good example of this.141 In addition,
administrative agencies may shape policy based on research that
tracks relationships between student diversity and educational
achievement. The United States Department of Education's Office
for Civil Rights has increased its research into connections between
student diversity and educational outcomes.142 If federal political
branches continue to grapple with such research, there may be an
increase in focused policies designed to maximize racial inclusion in
education.
CONCLUSION
For some time, the constitutional landscape of race, equality,
and education has proved insufficiently nuanced to address
persistent racial inequalities and the corresponding benefits of
fostering racial diversity. While the Court has limited the power of
public educational institutions to craft race-conscious policies aimed
at fostering diversity and decreasing pernicious racial isolation,
138. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 369-70 (2008).
139. The school-desegregation context provides a pertinent example. In
1992, the Supreme Court identified the factors that comprised a successful
desegregation plan in its ruling in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992).
However, such evidence of the components of a successful desegregation plan
would have been more helpful if introduced earlier. By that time, courts were
steadily dismantling such plans. Id. at 498-99.
140. Moran, supra note 9, at 521.
141. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT: STATE-REPORTED DATA FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2009-
10, at 7 (2012), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual
/nclbrpts.html.
142. See About the CRDC, SY 2011-12 Civ. RTS. DATA COLLECTION,
http://www.crdc.ed.gov/LEA/AboutCRDCAndOCR.aspx (last visited Mar. 7,
2013).
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social science evidence and broad support for the positive
educational and democratic outcomes that such policies engender
continue to grow. Given the power of precedent and the rich body of
empirical evidence at the Court's disposal supporting such policies,
courts may choose to clarify constitutional doctrine in this area to
maximize equal educational opportunity. History teaches us that
there are significant ways such evidence can facilitate finding
constitutional consensus and public understanding of the
relationship between racial diversity and educational opportunity.
